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Gusmio 'released' as violence escalates 
The Indonesian government stunned the 
international solidarity movement by 
announcing in January that it might be 
willing to 'release East Timor from Indonesia 
after the June 1999 parliamentary 
elections'. And in February, Xanana Gusmao 
was moved from prison to house arrest. 
Information minister Yunus Yosfiah gave the following statement on 27 January: 
A regional autonomy 'plus' will be accorded 
to East Timor. [ ... ] If this is not accepted by 
the mass in East Timor, we will suggest to the 
new membership of the people's Consulta-
tive Assembly - formed as the result of the 
next elections - to release East Timor from 
Indonesia [ ... ] This is very democratic because 
the people decide, not the president. (BBC) 
East Timorese leaders initially greeted the 
statement - the first time the government has 
publicly talked about independence - with 
caution. From prison Xanana Gusmao interpreted 
the remarks as Indonesia 'implicitly [accepting] 
our right to self-determination'. He said: 'We are 
satisfied with the decision of the Indonesian 
government. It is better late than never.' 
International reaction to the Indonesian 
announcement was warm. The US state 
department call ed the move 'a positive 
development' (AFP, 27 January 1999) . UN 
secretary-general Kofi Annan welcomed the 
move, but added that talks on the UN autonomy 
proposal would continue (see page 2). 
The announcement had little immediate 
impact at the official negotiations between 
Portugal and Indonesia, starting on 28 January, 
in New York. The Indonesian negotiators in New 
York made it clear that the government regards 
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independence as a 'second-best, worst-case 
scenario'. Indeed, Yosfiah 's statement was 
prefaced by the expressed hope that the East 
Timorese would accept 'Autonomy Plus ', 
whereby the territory would have wide-ranging 
autonomy within the Indonesian archipelago. 
Jakarta appears to be ruling out a long period 
of transition as envisaged by the resistance. The 
choice on offer seems to be the immediate 
acceptance of autonomy or independence after 
June. 
Gusmao under house arrest 
Xanana Gusmao's move from Cipinang prison 
to house arrest confirms Indonesia 's 
acceptance of his role in the negotiations 
over the autonomy package. This highlights 
the perception, held by diverse parties, that 
Xanana is the only Timorese leader who can 
guarantee national unity and reconciliation. 
(See page 3) 
New pragmatism? 
Whilst there are we ll-founded suspicions of 
Jakarta 's motives , the announcement may 
indicate that the government has decided to 
take a more pragmatic approach to the 'Timor 
problem '. For former president Suharto , 
retention of East Timor was a question of 
principle. For the new government, faced with 
severe problems on all fronts, this may no longer 
be the case. Indonesian finance minister, 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, has commented on the 
high political and financial cost of Jakarta's 
former East Timor policy. (AFP, 30 January 
1999) 
The apparent shift in Indonesia's policy may 
be partly the result of an about-turn in Australian 
foreign policy on East Timor. Australia was the 
only country to accord 'de jure' recognition to 
Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. The 
Australian government recently announced that 
although it would prefer to see an autonomous 
East Timor within Indonesia, it will respect the 
outcome of any referendum on self-deter-
mination. 
Indonesia's decision has been reported in 
some quarters to have been a relief to veteran 
foreign minister Ali Alatas, who will retire after 
the elections. The armed forces have always been 
regarded as the sticking point, as far as relin-
quishing East Timor is concerned. Yet armed 
forces chief General Wiranto has asserted: 'If 
the situation progresses in a way that allows East 
Tim or to separate with dignity from the Republic 
of Indonesia, the armed forces will accept this 
decision'. (El Pais, 29January1999) 
Violence continues 
Whether this will be borne out remains to be seen. 
Indications so far are not encouraging. The 
situation inside EastTimor has deteriorated as the 
Indonesian military has taken to arming pro-
integration militias. This might be part of a local 
strategy on the part of the military to present the 
East Timorese as ungovernable and therefore in 
need of military policing. The result has been an 
escalation of violent clashes to the point where 
internal displacement of people has become a 
new problem. An incident in a village near Suai 
in the last week ofJanuary, for example, resulted 
in three deaths and the displacement of more 
than 200 villagers. 
Too much, too soon? 
Many commentators are alarmed at the prospect 
ofindependence as soon as June, as EastTimor is 
far from ready for this eventuality. The resistance 
itself has backed a transitional phase. Any 
Indonesian withdrawal would have to be carefully 
managed at every level. There is the question of 
what would happen to the large number of 
migrants and transmigrantsfrom Indonesia. Civil 
servants are feeling particularlyvulnerable: they are 
un popularwi th pro-independence East Timorese, 
and many would probably leave East Tim or. 
Although Jakarta's apparent new flexibility is 
welcome, East Timor' s needs are now manifold. 
In the context of the forthcoming Commission on 
continued on page 2 
Summary I 
News of Indonesia's apparent readiness to 
let go of East Timor broke as this issue of 
Timor Link was going to press. Our front 
page is devoted to this story. The rest of the 
newsletter, compiled prior to the 
announcement, profiles Xanana Gusmao, 
examines pressing concerns for East 
Timorese women, and reports on new 
develo ments in the Balibo case. 
EDITORIAL 
Human RighL-;and the imminent visit of the UN 
\\'orking Group on :\rbitrary Detentions, the 
UnitedStates,.\ustraliaand the European Union 
must press the Indonesian authorities to deal 
with the local military units in East Tim or which 
are fomenting Yiolence. A UN human rights 
Discussions on broad-based autonomy 
for East Timor have been stalled by 
continuing military crackdowns and more 
deaths in the territory, creating suspicion 
about the idea among the East Timorese. 
The United Nations has been appealing for 
restraint and trying to bring the talks 
back on track. 
An initial plan for autonomy for East Tim or, 
Kc!rafted at the UN's request by Hurst 
Hannum, a western professor of international 
law, is being discussed at the Tripartite Talks 
between Portugal, Indonesia and the United 
Nations. But when Hannum presented the 
elements that might be included in an autonomy 
agreement to a group of Timorese, including 
members of the National Council ofTimorese 
Resistance (CNRT), in the Algarve in October 
1998, most of those present unequivocally 
opposed the idea if there was no assurance that 
self-determination could be incorporated into a 
final agreement. 
This reaction reflects more widespread 
feelings. Recent visitors to East Timor 
encountered strong opposition to autonomy. In 
some quarters even the notion of a referendum 
on the territory's status is seen asan insult to the 
people's suffering, and resistance to the 
occupation, over the past 23 years. When people 
bear the physical evidence - gashes from cuts, 
scars from cigarette burns - of abuse at the 
hands of the Indonesian military, it is difficult to 
argue that autonomy, even as a transitional phase, 
will be the last sacrifice asked of the East Timorese 
in order to save face for Indonesia and encourage 
a military withdrawal. 
Tomorrow's leaders 
The East Timorese Students Solidarity 
Council for Democracy has been attracting 
increasing attention. Milena Pires 
examines this movement which emerged 
during the post-Suharto period. 
The East Timorese Students Solidarity Council 
I for Democracy (ETSSCD) has filled a political 
void in East Tim or. Largely distrustful of some of 
the current political organisations, the 
population has opened its arms and embraced 
this new political force. The leaders of the 
ETSSCD have no political aspirations, nor do 
they appear to wish to challenge the current 
political order. But after 23 years of resistance the 
people are looking for alternatives. 
The idealism of the vouthful members and 
their devotion to the cause has made the 
ETSSCD a force with a large following. For the 
older generation, supporting the student council 
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monitoring presence is needed immediately. 
International supportforwhat might turn out to 
be an indecently brief transition period must now 
be considered. High on the list of priorities must 
be material and technical support aimed at 
preventing conflict that could result from such a 
Although Jose Ramos-Horta personally 
defended autonomy as a viable transitional 
arrangement when he presented the peace 
plan of the National Council of Maubere 
Resistance (CNRM) at the European 
Parliament in 1993, he has also stated that 
Xanana Gusmao is the only person capable of 
convincing the people that autonomy is a 
viable step towards a referendum. 
In an interview with the Portuguese news 
agency, Lusa, on 16 December 1998, Gusmao 
said: 'If I accepted autonomy, it was because I 
considered the need, for a time, for political 
adaptation.' He said that the East Timorese 
should negotiate a 10-year autonomy period 
as a transitional phase, leading to self-
determination. A transition is necessary 'not 
only to permit the Timorese to educate 
themselves politically', he said, but to create 
'the necessary infrastructures, in the area of 
human resources and other areas'. 
Mistrust 
However, the East Timorese remain at the 
periphery of the Tripartite Talks. The UN 
secretary-general Kofi Annan and his represen-
tatives have consulted only political and church 
leaders. Little information has reached the 
Timorese population, and many who have 
argued in the past that decision-making should 
be centred on the people, and remain inside 
East Timor, today are trying to encourage the 
East Timorese people to be patient. 
In August 1998 Agio Pereira of the East Tim or 
Relief Association told the Matebian News (run 
by East Timorese in Australia) that the CNRT 
has become as simple as supporting their own 
sons and daughters. 
The ETSSCD is an independent body. It was 
formed on 8 June 1998, although, as yet, the 
University of East Timor has not accepted the 
student council as a formal part of the university. 
Its main goals are to encourage reconciliation, 
promote participatory democracy and prepare 
ci,il society for self-government. The scope of 
its activities is impressive, but it has few funds. 
Apart from its well publicised Free Speech 
Forums, or Mini Dialogues, the ETSSCD also 
runs weekend classes to establish discussion 
groups, and it promotes gender equality and 
women's rights through the Grupo Feton Foen 
Sae Timor Lorn Sae. 
Active 
Although some Timorese fear it will reorganise 
and become a political party, the ETSSCD has 
dramatic policy shift. The UN negotiations should 
now, as a matter of urgency, begin to address a 
wide spectrum of East Timorese interlocutors, 
particularly marginalised groups such as women. 
The next issue of Timor Link will examine the 
priorities in detail. 
would risk alienating the student movement by 
supporting a transitional autonomy. But there 
does not seem to be a consensus, even within 
CNRT, on this difficult issue. The Timorese 
Democratic Union (UDT) opposed autonomy, 
and the five political parties stated on 11 August 
1998 (see Timor Link 45) that they were against 
autonomy under Indonesia. 
Part of the difficulty is that Jakarta continues 
to demand that under the terms of the autonomy 
offer defence , foreign relations and fiscal 
concerns remain under its control, although 
there may be an opportunity to discuss some 
aspects of these areas. Meanwhile, relations 
between East Timor and Jakarta, including 
arbitration, and the internal structure of any 
new government, are still to be considered. 
Other elements of the agreement being 
discussed include the economy, the electoral 
and judicial systems and policing, but not the 
key question of sovereignty. 
The East Timorese will remain suspicious· of 
autonomy under Indonesian control unless 
there is transparency and an attempt to discuss, 
systematically, how the arrangement would work 
for East Tim or, to examine each of the elements 
that need to be incorporated into an agreement, . 
and to create wider awareness of the positive 
aspects of the proposal. 
• CORRECTION: 'Autonomy and the law on 
self-determination' ( Timor Link 45) was written 
by Pedro Pinto Leite, secretary-general of the 
International Platform of Jurists for East Timor 
(IPJET). His article was from the introduction of 
a new book The East Timor Probl,em and the rol,e of 
Europe (IPJET, 1998). 
taken a decision not to compete with other youth 
organisations - it sees its role as simply com-
plementing the work of other organisations and 
groups. It believes that the people need to take 
an active role in decision making. 
The ETSSCD works at the grassroots to 
ensure that people are fully informed on a wide 
range of subjects, from the meaning of a 
referendum to the implications of autonomy. 
It also promotes awareness about governance 
and argues that any future government, 
including a transitional one, must be 
representative and democratic. It wants to 
monitor the process so that candidates are 
elected on the basis of free elections and on 
their abilities. 
For now Xanana Gusmao is the undisputed 
leader; but the ETSSCD may well produce the 
leader that East Timor will need in the post-
Xanana years. 
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The Mandela of limor 
Roque Rodrigues examines the life of 
Xanana Gusmao and his role in the struggle 
to bring peace to East Timor. 
llfhen East Tim or was invaded by Indonesian 
WI troops 23 years ago, Xanana Gusmao was 
virtually unknown. The East Timorese people 
took to the mountains and resisted the invasion 
with great determination, only to face napalm, 
defoliants, systematic executions and induced 
starvation . But they were driven out of the 
mountains and forced into resettlement centres, 
which were little more than concentration camps. 
Most members of the central committee of 
Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor) were killed, only Mau 
Hunu and Xanana Gusmao surviving. After the 
death of its president, Nicolau Lobato, on 31 
December 1978, Xanana assumed the leadership 
ofFretilin. It changed his life. 
He consulted the population to see whether 
they were willing to continue resistance. Once 
assured of the people 's support, Xanana began 
to reorganise the movement. This long process 
XANANA GUSMAO 
culminated in 1981 when at the national Demonstrators callforXanana Gusmiio 'sre'-ease. His freedom coul,d unwck the negotiations over East Timor'sfuture. 
conference he was elected leader ofFretilin and 
chosen as commander-in-chief ofFalantil (the 
National Liberation Armed Forces of East 
Timor) , a responsibility which, in practice, he 
had taken on after Lobato 's death. 
Building peace 
After two years under his responsibility, Falantil 
initiated talks with the occupying armed forces 
in the liberated areas of East Timor. A ceasefire 
was achieved but within five months Indonesia 
had broken it: on 8 August 1983, 400 people 
were massacred in Kraras. 
Xanana conceived and implemented a policy 
of national unity which involved building 
contacts with the Catholic church and 
developing a clandestine network in urban areas 
and other occupied zones. In 1988 the success of 
this initiative enabled Xanana to create the 
National Council of Maubere Resistance 
(CNRM). 
Capture 
Xanana was captured by the Indonesian armed 
forces on 20 November 1992, a year after the 
Santa Cruz massacre, and imprisoned in Jakarta. 
He was sentenced to life imprisonment following 
a trial denounced as farcical by all international 
observers. The sentence was later commuted to 
20years. 
During the trial Xanana revealed himself to be 
an exceptional man, for while appearing to give 
in to Indonesian pressure , he managed to 
denounce the genocidal character of the 
Indonesian occupation in front of the interna-
tional press. 
Symbol 
To the people of East Timor, Xanana has 
become a symbol of their struggle for freedom, 
the key person in the political negotiations for 
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peace over two decades of conflict. In April 1998, 
the end of the first East Timorese National 
Convention in the Diaspora, he was unanimously 
acclaimed president of the CNRM. Xanana 
continues to direct its strategy. 
Known to the international media as the 
'Mandela of Timor' , Xanana is an inspiration 
to the growing pro-democracy movement in 
Indonesia itself. When accepting the Nobel 
Peace Prize, Jose Ramos Horta said: 
This speech belongs to someone else who 
should be here today. He is an outstanding 
man of courage, tolerance and statesmanship. 
Yet, this man is in prison for no other crime 
than his ideas and vision of peace and 
freedom. [ ... ] Through Xanana, I bow to my 
people in profound respect, loyalty and 
humility because they are the real heroes and 
peace-makers. 
President Nelson Mandela of South Africa met 
with Xanana during a state visit to Indonesia in 
July 1997 and discussed the East Timor issue for 
two hours with him. In April 1998 Mandela sent 
his foreign minister, Alfred Nzo, to follow up 
these discussions. Nzo met with Xanana alone for 
half an hour, monitored by the Indonesian 
military. 
Since Suharto's resignation on 21May1998, 
many heads of state and government officials 
have joined the campaign for Xanana's release. 
Such a move would unlock the negotiating 
process, allowing the East Timorese represen-
tatives to participate fully in the UN-sponsored 
talks, which they are now willing to do provided 
they are led by Xanana Gusmao. 
Clear vision 
Xanana has hardly wasted his time in prison. As 
well as studying law and English , he has also 
learnt to speak Bahasa Indonesia. Being in the 
same jail as Indonesian pro-democracy leaders, 
such as Muchtar Pakpahan, has enabled him to 
establish strong ties with the Indonesian pro-
democracy movement. 
The military occupation of East Timor has 
fractured the society but Xanana has earned 
such respect that he could promote reconcilia-
tion within Timorese society and a smooth 
transition to a free East Tim or. The past 23 years 
have shown that there is no military solution. 
But the current situation offers an opportunity 
to solve the East Timor conflict that cannot be 
missed. Xanana Gusmao could help the 
Indonesians leave the territory without losing 
face, and guarantee stability in the region. He has 
the capacity to understand all the sensibilities 
involved, both internally and on the interna-
tional scene. 
Roque Rodrigues is a member of the National Executive 
Committee of the CNRT. 
Who is Xanana? I 
--- --------------- --- ------
Jose Alexandre Gusmao, alias Kay Raia Xanana 
Gusmao, was born on 20 June 1946 in Laleia, 
Manatuto, East Timor. He, one brother and 
five sisters were raised in the country. His father 
was a school teacher and Xanana completed 
primary and started secondary school at the 
Catholic mission of Nossa Senhora de Fatima in 
Dare, before going to Dili. He started work at 
a young age, in the mornings as a chartered 
surveyor and in the afternoons teaching at the 
Chinese school. In April 1974 he joined the 
staff of A Voz de Timar (The Voice ofTimor -
a newspaper published in East Timor prior to 
August 1975) . He became a member ofFretilin 
- the Revolutionary Front for an Independent 
East Timor - that same year, later becoming 
deputy head ofits Department oflnformation. 
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AIETD 
sofchange 
Zacarias da Costa has been a participant 
at all four of the All-inclusive Intra East 
Timorese Dialogue (AIETD). Here he 
analyses the positions of the major players 
at the negotiations at this crucial period 
in East Timor's struggle for self-
detennination. 
Apart from some new participants from East Timor, the format of the fourth All-inclusive 
Intra East Timorese Dialogue, held at Krumbach 
castle in Austria from 31 October to 1 November 
1998, remained unchanged from the previous 
three. 
Also unchanged was the position of the 
pro-integration participants, this time led by 
Jose Tavares, a junior Timorese diplomat 
from Jakarta, who substituted for Ambassador 
Francisco Lopes da Cruz. Lopes da Cruz had 
twice visited Xanana Gusmao , president of 
the National Council of Timorese Resistance 
(CNRT) , in prison, and has since appeared to 
qualify his seemingly unquestioning 
execution of Jakarta ' s orders. This may 
explain the substitution o~ Tavares , well 
trained in receiving and executing orders 
from the capital. Jakarta would appear to 
have adopted an alternative strategy. 
The resistance movement was represented at 
the latest talks by the newly created CNRT, 
reinforced by Armandina Gusmao, sister of 
Xanana, Mau Huno, former Falintil commander, 
and Amero da Silva, leader of the East Timorese 
Students Solidarity Council for Democracy. The 
CNRT had met a few weeks earlier in Algarve, 
Portugal , to devise a coordinated strategy. 
However , a disagreement between longer-
standing members of the CNRT's political 
council on strategy and timing of various 
initiatives within the meeting fueled the 
Indonesian government and media propaganda 
machines. 
It also gave the Indonesian military in East 
Timor the opportunity to propagate the myth 
that the resistance could not agree on anything 
and that East Timorese aspirations for self-
government were unviable. Jose Ramos-Horta, 
deputy president of the CNRTand 1996 Nobel 
peace p1ize winner, was targeted by some sectors 
of the Indon esian go,·ernment-run media 
followin g off-th e-cuff remarks made by 
disgruntled CNRT colleagues. 
Development 
The 'Third Way' group, led by Abilio Araujo , 
former President ofFretilin, took a more oppor-
tunistic and conciliatory stance in an attempt to 
reflect the winds of change inJakarta whipped 
up since Suharto 's demise. While he stopped 
short of using the term 'self-determination ', 
Araujo stated that there was a need to determine 
the collective will of the people. He argued that 
development was the answer to all evils in East 
Timor, including human rights violations. 
The current governor of East Timor, Abilio 
Soares, was absent from the meetings in Austria, 
having reported sick, although he did attend 
the opening and closing sessions. A once 
significant presence at the table , Soares now 
appears more marginalised given recent devel-
opments. Former governor Mario Carrascalao 
was another notable absentee. He declined his 
invitation to attend because, under the current 
format, participants cannot discuss the political 
status of East Tim or. 
Indeed, the dialogue 's now outdated and 
unworkable model was the major concern of 
the CNRT, and most of the participants other 
than those loyal to Jakarta. The terms of 
reference , agreed four years ago by the foreign 
ministers of Portugal and Indonesia, together 
with the United Nations, forbid discussion of 
the territory's political status, and a formal 
proposal to create another forum to debate 
these ideas was blocked by Jakarta, despite a 
consensus in favour among the other 
participants . Tavares stated that a formal 
proposal was a waste of time because Jakarta 
would issue official instructions to block it -
an indication of the Indonesian government's 
continuing policy of casual disengagement 
from a process which it now appears to view as 
even more of a sideshow than ever. 
Similarly, desire to create a third forum to 
discuss technical issues , drawing from the 
experience of a multi-disciplinary team, was also 
blocked by the pro-Jakarta and Third Way groups. 
Democracy 
In contrast to the first three AIETD sessions, there 
was no final statement agreed at this round of 
talks.Jakarta took this as an opportunity to try to 
discredit the Timorese. However ,Jamsheed 
Marker, UN special envoy for East Timor, said 
that the failure to agree was in no way detrimental 
to the Timorese, but demonstrated to its fullest 
capacity the practice of democracy. Portugal 's 
foreign minister,Jaime Gama, also said he was 
satisfied with the discussions, stating that now was 
the time forunanimity because participants had 
moved beyond a simplistic consensual model. 
However, most of the 42 participants did sign 
an eight-page document combining the initial 
thoughts of the CNRT with points made in a 
letter written by Bishop Carlos Belo , and 
presented by Father Antonio Belo, vicar general 
of Dili . This paper stressed the need to discuss 
political questions; it covered detailed proposals 
for development and women's rights; and stated 
that 'the current format of the AIETD does not 
correspond to the challenges and needs of the 
current situation'. It concluded that a genuine 
intra-Timorese dialogue can only be held inside 
East Timor, must be truly representative of all of 
East Timor's population (at present there are 
only four women participants compared to 38 
male participants) , and must be free from the 
constraints imposed by Jakarta. 
The first two dialogues in the AIETD (which 
took place in 1995 and 1996) brought together 
Timorese participants of different political 
opinions, some of whom had not spoken to each 
other in over 20 years. These initial talks also 
helped people to cross the boundaries created 
when they were separated by the civil conflict 
of August 1975; they brought together two 
generations ofTimorese people who shared the 
aim of finding a solution to the conflict. 
However, the current situations in East Timor, 
in Indonesia, and internationally, have made 
the format of the talks cumbersome, since they 
have not been permitted to evolve into a more 
useful vehicle for East Timorese input. 
Zacarias da Costa represents East Timar at the 
European Union and the United Nations, and was 
vicepresident of the Timorese Democratic Union (UD1) 
until his resignation in October 1998. 
The All-inclusive lntra-East-Timorese Dialogue: The story so far 
-------
- -
3-6June 1995 Final declaration recalled resolution 37 / 30 of the UN General Assembly. The declaration was later rejected 
when pro-integration Timorese, with an ear to their Indonesian sponsors, realised that this resolution 
recognised Portugal as the administering power. 
19-22 March 1996 Heavy pressure from Indonesian sponsored participants, especially Francisco Lopez da Cruz, led to the 
watering-down of the final communique. 
20-23 October 1997 Five new participants admitted, including two women, who attempt to introduce a focus on women's issues. 
Catholic Bishops of East Timor table letter appealing for demilitarisation and a definitive ceasefire. With political 
questions still precluded, agreement reached over founding a cultural centre. 
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Uncovering the 
key to East 
Timor's future 
The truth about the murders of British and 
Australian newsmen in Balibo in 1975 is 
still being covered up. Hugh Dowson 
examines a 23 year-old scandal. 
'Balibo', says Bruce Haigh, 'is the chink 
through which the whole East Tim or issue 
can be prised open.' 
In the 1970s as an Australian diplomat Haigh 
helped Donald Woods escape from South Africa 
with the text of 'Biko'. In the mid 1980s, as an 
official at the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs & Trade (DFAT), he 'managed' part of 
the Balibo cover-up. 
But Haigh will not give evidence to his 
government's recently re-opened 'preliminary 
evaluation' of the Balibo murders . Like the 
families of the newsmen who died there (for 
whose benefit the 'evaluation' supposedly exists), 
like many Timorese, and like other ex-<liplomats, 
he has no confidence in the evaluation process. 
Instead, Haigh wants to help end the cover-up 
that consigns East Timor to Indonesia's 
genocidal embrace. 
But un ti! British media - and parliamentary 
- interest in Balibo boils over, key Indonesian 
generals will assume that the occupation can 
continue forever. 
Background 
From late 1974 Australian diplomats were 
receiving regular briefings from intermediaries 
about Indonesian generals Murtopo and 
Murdani's plans to gain East Timor. By early 
1975 Indonesian special troops, called 
Kopassandha (now Kopassus) , were inside East 
Timor destabilising the territory as it was 
decolonised. On 11 August 1975 the Indonesian-
sponsored civil war broke out and the Australian 
government tried to exclude western journalists 
so that Indonesia's Antara news agency could 
manipulate news. 
Indonesian briefings to Allan Taylor, then the 
political counsellor in Australia's embassy in 
Jakarta, later ambassador and now head of 
Australia's Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), 
became daily events. 
However, in late August 1975, Australia's 
Channel 9 news team broke Antara's 
stranglehold. Reaching Dili by boat, the 
three-man group included news director 
Gerald Stone and TV cameraman Brian 
Peters, (a British citizen) and the Australian 
Kerry Packer. They revealed that Fretilin's 
forces were winning the civil war. Their 
presence may have prevented a full scale 
invasion taking place that September. 
Stone and Packer left East Tim or from Atauro 
Island in early September on a Royal Australian 
Air Force plane. But Peters remained for a week, 
continued on page 8 
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EAST TIMOR: lime for change 
Timor, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal began decolonising East 
Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. A small third party, Apodeti, 
was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene 
if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 
1975, however, Fretilin was in control of 
virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following 
the defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed WestTimor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as illegal. 
The invasion and annexation of East Timor 
has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third 
of the population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian rule. But the majority of Timorese 
have not accepted subjugation: Indonesia has 
been unable to eliminate the desire of the East 
Timorese for self-determination and an armed 
resistance movement still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been condemned 
by successive UN resolutions, the international 
community has done little or nothing to 
implement them, given the major economic 
and geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status - it has the world's fifth largest 
population, and large reserves of oil and other 
natural resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Timor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited 
the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of East 
Timor by the UN, created huge expectations 
of change. To great disappointment in East 
Timor, the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12November1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral pro~ion held at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the East Timorese 
capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed 
by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz massacre 
provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN secretary-general has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased pressure 
to reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese under the auspices of the UN. 
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Confronting rape 
In the second of her reports on women in 
East Timor, Ines Almeida looks at the 
prevalence of rape and asks whether the 
CNRT will stand up for women's rights. 
In East Timor the women's struggle is a central part of the struggle for liberation. On Inter-
national Women's DaY on 8 March 1998, the 
Timorese \\"omen's Communication Forum 
(FOKUSPER) organised a conference and a 
play about women's roles. It created humour 
and debate and was part of the educational 
process which this active women's group is trying 
to promote. 
Health conditions for many women in 
East Timor are appalling, and constraints on 
freedom of movement mean women do not 
benefit from appropriate education or job 
opportunities. 
Recent research undertaken by a working 
group of the East Timor Relief Association 
(ETRA) showed there is systematic rape and 
humiliation ofTimorese women. In Viqueque, 
a sub-district in the eastern part of East Timor, 
the military recently raped 15 women. A Timor-
based human rights group is investigating the 
incidents, but a number of the victims are afraid 
to speak. 
Daily reality 
Some women working for the Clandestine Front 
have also been raped, including 19 year-old 
Maria dos Santos (not her real name) , whose 
father and brotl1er were killed by the Indonesian 
military in 1975. She was raped for two 
consecutive davs by Indonesian soldiers, and 
bore a child as a result. 
In Lospalos, local Timorese women have been 
subjected to rape by the territorial military 
operations battalion (BTT) since 1978. The 
average age of the women is 30, although some 
much younger women are also targeted. Many 
fathers are threatened if they don't give up their 
daughters. 
Confronting the daily reality of women's lives 
is a challenge for both women and men in East 
Timor. The CNRT has an Institute of Women's 
Affairs, and there are references to women in 
the CNRT's general statement of principles 
('Magna Carta'). But these need to be matched 
by specific and carefully-devised actions . 
Whether the CNRT can do this is another 
question. 
Ines Almeida is a Timorese activist. She is deputy 
director of the East Timar Relief Association (ETRA) 
and the only Timorese woman to have participated 
in all four sessions of the All-inclusive Intra-East 
Timorese Dialogues. 
Parallel hope for Timor's women 
The United Nations special rapporteur 
on violence against women visited 
East Timor for the first time in 1998; 
and after years of being marginalised 
and abused,Timorese women are 
mobilising. 
The Dili Spring, the mass demonstrations from 
I September to December 1998, which 
brought thousands ofTimorese people to the 
streets for the first time, was paralleled by a 
strategic and increasingly visible Timorese 
women's movement. The movement has been 
slowly taking shape over years, but 1998 saw the 
first steps towards consolidation. 
Two important public events were organised 
by Grupo Feton Foen Sae Timor Loro Sae and 
Fokusper, the Timorese Women 's Communi-
cation Forum in November. The first, a 
conference which discussed women's lives under 
the Indonesian military occupation, took place 
on the 23 November in Dili, with 200 partici-
pants. The second, a seminar and protest to 
mark the International Day Against Violence 
.\gainst Women, followed on 25 November. 
More than 500 people took part. 
Achievements 
Both forums are remarkable achievements in 
a society where women have been accustomed 
to silence. Considering that neither of the 
main organising bodies have been in existence 
for much longer than a year, their ability to 
attract such large numbers is a reflection of 
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the members' abilities, courage, determina-
tion and commitment to raising awareness of 
women's rights. A constant focus of the forums 
has been mental violence, although women 
were encouraged to wake up and fight against 
all forms of violence, be it from the Indonesian 
military, the government or their own menfolk. 
Violence 
In early December Dr Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
the UN special rapporteur on violence against 
women, went on a three-day visit to the 
territory. 
She had earlier reported on violence against 
women in East Tim or to the 54th session of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. 
This report had focused on state-sanctioned 
violence. Dr Coomaraswamy had stated that 
she received a large number of complaints 
about sexual violence by Indonesian security 
forces in East Timor. These included 'sexual 
violence, rape, forced marriage, forced prosti-
tution and the intimidation of female relatives 
of suspected activists '. 'Indonesian state 
authorities have not responded in accordance 
with their international obligations', said the 
rapporteur. None of the cases resulted in 
prosecution. 
Dr Coomaraswamy is due to present the 
findings of her December visit to the 55th 
session of the UNCHR, to be held in March and 
April 1999. Her findings in East Timor should 
help Timorese women activists and the women's 
movement in their work. 
Poem by 
Filomena Barros dos Reis 
East Timor, 10 November 1998 
Woman 
Woman you are like a flower 
That re/,eases your .fragrance 
To the comers of the world 
Woman you are like water 
That flows to moisten the land 
In order that all living things grow 
Woman your love 
Is as great as a river 
That flows our way 
To cool the feelings of those who are fil/,ed 
with anger 
And moisten their thirsty mouth 
Woman your work is enormous 
Although you have gi-ven yourself to fill 
this world 
This world will not recognise you 
You are always wrong 
According to this world's mouth 
Hhh e Timor Woman 
The time has already arrived 
For you to open your mouth 
To shout to the world 
That you have suffered more than enough 
Demand your rights 
The rights that they have taken 
Devastating your life 
Hhh e Timor Woman 
Stand up 
Help one another 
Shout even louder 
Women's rights 
Women's rights 
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Flying back to new freedoms 
After more than 20 years' absence from 
her native East Timor, CllR policy officer 
Milena Pires visited her country in 
September 1998. Here she reports on 
some of the changes taking place despite 
the continuing presence of the Indonesian 
military. 
Although I left East Tim or when I was a child the joy of my return after 23 years cannot 
be described fully in words. A surreal experience 
at times, I tried to absorb all that I could, making 
up for lost time in a country where life and 
death are close neighbours. 
Yet in the 12 days which took me from the 
capital Dili to the extreme south-western region 
of Suai and to Baucau in the east, what I found 
in all the places I visited and among all the 
people I met was a determination to live in 
peace, in freedom, and with justice. 
Imprints of occupation 
Approaching the island from the north west I 
saw again the coastal towns of Maubara, 
Liquica and the surrounding area close to Dili, 
bordered by the stark mountains and the 
colour of exposed red earth - the most visible 
mark of the Indonesian military occupation. 
Much of the vegetation has been cleared and 
the trees cut to deprive the armed resistance, 
Falantil, of camouflage. Poverty has also forced 
the Timorese to cut and sell wood for fuel. 
Sandalwood and other highly valued woods, 
such as teak, have been plundered by Indon-
esian conglomerates. The evidence of envi-
ronmental degradation marks the hills near 
Dili and is repeated elsewhere in the country. 
The second most visible sign of the 
occupation is the intimidating presence of the 
military, which is institutionalised in all aspects 
of daily life . There are numerous imposing 
military and police compounds encased by 
barbed wire; public servants wear a military-style 
uniform; there are military check-points 
throughout the country; and patrols criss-cross 
the streets of Dili at dusk. 
One evening I saw open trucks carrying at 
least 20 soldiers, with their guns pointed 
menacingly forwards in a display of the routine 
intimidation which EastTimorese have learned 
to expect. Their black ski masks were not for 
the cold - the children around me whispered 
'ninjas' (state-sponsored thugs). Outside Dili 
soldiers wear civilian clothes, but are distin-
guished by the arms they carry, as they ride on 
motor bikes, or as groups of six to eight in 
open topped trucks. 
After Suharto 
There have been some marked changes in East 
Timor since the fall of Suharto. One woman 
told me that 'reformasi', the new period of 
reforms, was an opportunity to push the 
boundaries, to enlarge the space for action. The 
Timorese cannot afford to miss this opportunity, 
she said. She was confident that every new and 
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bold action was protected by a new consensus 
among the people, who had tested their right to 
freedom of assembly over the past few months 
(see Timar Link 44, page 2) and would not 
hesitate to take to the streets in massive protests 
if any of the leaders of these actions were 
targeted. 
Others I met were more hesitant, suspecting 
Indonesia's new flexibility is a trap to identify 
key individuals and begin a more severe 
crackdown. Many of the new freedoms in East 
Timor feel fragile. There is a hangman 's noose 
around the territory, whose cord the military can 
tighten and loosen at will. Recent military action 
in Alas and Maliana has shown this to be true. 
Dreams 
However, self-determination and indepen-
dence no longer feel like nebulous dreams. In 
Baucau, under the supportive guidance of the 
local Catholic diocese, a small cooperative has 
been set up to provide income-generating and 
employment opportunities for young people 
and women. The aim is to prepare the people 
to be self-sufficient so that they can contribute 
to East Timor's future economy. 
I had the privilege of meeting a young 
man who had worked his way through 
tertiary studies and was now running a small 
carpentry workshop from the verandah of a 
house he rented from the church. The work-
shop employed six people who hand-made 
beautiful pieces of furniture in rosewood. 
They possessed one electric tool between 
them, and they took turns using it to cut, 
shape, join and finish each of the pieces. 
Their dream is to teach their skills to other 
unemployed young people so that the 
workshop can be expanded. 
I also met a remarkable woman who runs a 
sewing workshop from a small house whose 
foundations she dug and laid herself. Her life 
has been touched many times by loss and 
sadness - her husband was imprisoned and 
beaten to death by Indonesian soldiers shortly 
after the invasion - and yet she derives great 
strength and purpose from these experiences. 
She has taken in several orphans and raised 
and educated them alongside herown children. 
Her dream is to share her skills in sewing and 
cooking with other women so that they too can 
set up their own small business, or join the 
workshop and teach their skills to others. 
Key people in both the carpentry and sewing 
workshops believe they are doing more than 
just generating income. They want to 
incorporate best-practice models into the 
workshops, so workers' rights, occupational 
health and safety matters and other industrial 
issues are taught as an integral part of the project. 
These initiatives, and others that I visited, are 
clearly in need of funding, but they are 
suspicious of finance from overseas. Some 
Timorese organisations have flatly refused to 
compromise the real needs of their constituen-
cies by attempting to tailor applications so that 
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they appeal to funders. Undoubtedly, greater 
flexibility is needed from potential funders if 
they are really to address the needs of people on 
the ground. 
Rumours 
Because of the oppressive policies ruling their 
lives, many of the East Timorese I met are highly 
politicised. Nevertheless many had a very black-
and-white view of the current UN-brokered talks 
between Portugal and Indonesia. They 
supported a referendum because they equated 
this with independence, but opposed the idea of 
autonomy because it was seen as integration 
with Indonesia. 
The lack of clear and concrete information 
fuels a rich rumour mill, whose cycle detracts 
from sound and informed decision making, 
especially in a society which lives in fear and is 
accustomed to receiving information by word 
of mouth . Continuous communication bet-
ween the rest of the world and East Timor is 
crucial so as to provide information on partic-
ipatory democracy, women 's rights, workers' 
rights and other civil, political, cultural and 
socio-economic rights, not to mention occu-
pational health and safety issues, hygiene, 
nutrition and so on. 
It is of the utmost importance that visitors 
continue to go to East Timor as a simple 
reminder of civility, and in order to reverse the 
cycle of the hunter and prey, to make the 
observer - the Indonesian military - the 
observed. 
Calendar of events 
January to July 1999 
FEBRUARY Triparite Talks, New York 
22 MARCH-30 APRIL United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, Geneva 
8 MARCH International Women's Day 
1-19 MARCH 43rd Session of the Commission 
on the Status of Women 
5-9 APRIL Conference on a Strategic 
Development Plan for East Timor, 
Melbourne, Australia 
MAY Indonesian General Elections 
20 JUNE Birthday ofXanana Gusmao 
JUNE-JULY United Nations Decolonisation 
Committee meeting, New York 
JULY International Conference of East 
Timorese Studies, University of Western 
Sydney, Macarthur, NSW, Australia, organised 
by Dr Geoffrey Hull 
3rd International Tetun Conference, 
Melbourne, Australia, organised by the 
Japanese Support Committee for Darwin East 
Timorese School 
Updates can be obtained from the East Timor 
Relief Association (ETRA) 
website: http: / / www.pactok.net.au/ docs/ et 
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BALIBO 
continued from page 5 
filming 1-10 women and children refugees from 
the Timorese Democratic Union (C DT) and 
recording Fretilin president \.a\ier doAmaral 's 
plea to A.umalia to help stop the invasion. 
Bv 8 September 1975 (according to a leak 
from the US Defence Intelligence Agency) the 
ci\il war had collapsed, \1ith Fretilin announcing 
victon although resistance from the UDT 
contin ued . BY the end of the month more 
journalists had entered th e countrv. On 10 
October Australia's Channel 7 team (cameraman 
Gary Cunningham, reporter Greg Shackleton 
and soundman Tony Stewart) arrived to 
investigate Antara's claim that East Timorese 
anti-Fretilin forces had seized the border post 
of Batugade and would soon wrest East Tim or 
from Fretilin. In reality, Kopassandha's Batugade 
operation was the first stage of the full-scale 
invasion scheduled for mid October. 
On 13 October Australian ambassador 
Woolcott cabled Canberra from Jakarta with 
the news that some 3,200 Indonesian troops 
would sweep across East Timor from the border 
on 16 October, some 800 of them via Balibo. 
The Channel 7 team arrived at Balibo for the 
second time, and newsmen from Channel 9 
(Channel Ts rival) arrived that evening -
reporter Malcolm Rennie and cameraman Brian 
Peters, both British citizens with British 
passports. 
Outrage 
Although by 15 October DFAT must have known 
that the two news teams were at the border, it did 
not ask Woolcott to urge General Murdani to 
delay the illegal invasion until they left. 
Kopassandha also knew that the newsmen were 
there and, on 16 October, murdered them. The 
murdered men were photographed dressed in 
Portuguese uniforms and draped over machine 
A development 
strategy 
The National Council of Timorese 
Resistance (CNRTJ is beginning to prepare 
a development plan for East Timor. 
After 23 years as a liberation movement, the East Timorese resistance is beginning the 
difficult transformation into a force for self-
government. A group of Timorese academics 
and other friends of East Timor assembled in 
Algarve , Portugal, between 21 and 25 
October 1998, to develop a strategic plan for 
East Timor's development. 
The week-long meeting not only identified 
kc\· sectors for development - its original 
aim - but also carried out a preliminary 
analysis and formed a critique of the current 
situation. It looked at the resomces needed 
to develop the sectors during a transitional 
phase to independence for East Timor. The 
principle sectors identified are agriculture, 
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guns. The bodies \\'ere burnt and cmshed. 
Fearing protests from the newsmen's 
governments, and assuming that Murdani had 
thrown away am hope of gaining East Timor, 
President Suharto stopped the invasion. 
On 12 November, after Australia's 'unreliable ' 
Labour government had been dismissed by the 
governor-general, four shoe-boxes containing 
the alleged remains of the five newsmen were 
handed to Woolcott by General Sugama of 
Indonesia's Bakin intelljgence agency, along 
with three notebooks, a letter written at Balibo 
on 15 October, and two British passports. One 
of the notebooks was in Greg Shackleton's 
writing and was released to his widow Shirley in 
December 1975 - the others remain 
unreleased. The letter was presumably Brian 
Peters' s letter to his family in Bristol, from whom 
it is still withheld. 
In handing over the British passports Suharto 
was seeking the British government's view of 
the murders, and of genocide as a 'solution' to 
the East Tim or 'problem'. Yet the Foreign Office 
says that Australian officials withheld the British 
passports until late January 1976, by which time 
mass murder was already rife. The Australian 
government held an elaborate 'funeral' for the 
newsmen on 5 December, having tricked the 
newsmen 's families into agreeing to aJakarta 
burial , and then not inviting them. It even 
withheld the photographs from the families 
un ti! the mid 1990s - out of ' com passion ' . 
On 7 December 1975 full-scale invasion of 
East Tim or was resumed. 
'Investigations' 
All 'investigations' into the 'unexplained' deaths 
of the newsmen - notably Allan Taylor's of 
April/May 1976, and that of Tom Sherman 
(former Australian National Crime Authority 
boss) in 1995/ 96 and October 1998-are part 
of an on-going cover-up. 
infrastructure , education, health , public 
admin istration, the environment and the 
judicial system. 
An overriding concern was that resources 
channeled to East Timor from abroad should 
be better coordinated than at present. There is 
a growing interest among international funders 
in East Timor's potential, and duplicated or 
badly managed projects could detract from the 
area's real developmental needs. Participants 
felt it was important to limit development aid 
going into East Timor to prevent the country 
becoming dependent , and to increase the 
chances that aid will meet people's real needs. 
The second phase of the CNRT planning 
process will take place in Melbourne, Australia, 
in April 1999, when regional working groups 
will present extensive papers for more in-depth 
discussion. In the third phase, to take place in the 
first half of 1999, information on each sector 
will be included in a document to be presented 
to the National Political Council of the CNRT, 
along with recommendations for a strategic all-
inclusive and participatory development policy 
for East Timor. 
The 'preliminary evaluation ' was re,·i,ed br 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, after the 
ABC's 'Foreign Correspondent' documentary 
on Balibo was shown on 20 October 1998, 
featuring a witness who described how he 
monitored the Fretilin mi!itary's radio traffic 
for Kopassandha and alerted Kalbuadi to the 
newsmen's presence in Balibo. This person, 
'Ll ', had been presented to Sherman in 
Portugal in 1996 by Jill Jolliffe , an Australian 
journalist who was in Dili on the day of the 
murders and had received an 'official tip' that 
'something big' was happening at the border. 
But Ll had told Sherman there was no such 
foreknowledge and that the newsmen died by 
accident , in a battle - information which 
Sherman used in his report. 
This film also contained an eyewitness 
account of Yun us Yosfiah's orders at Balibo to 
kill the newsmen, given by Olandino Maia 
Guterres, whose escape from East Timor was 
assisted by Jolliffe . The day after the 
documentary Downer announced that Sherman 
would try to interview both Guterres and 'Ll '. 
The Australian Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists has called for a judicial 
inquiry, and Haigh and other witnesses are ready 
to testify. 
In London on 20 October 1998 a crowded 
press conference, chaired by Ann Clwyd MP, 
heard from Peters's sister, from Rennie's 
cousin, and from Nobel Peace prize winner, 
Jose Ramos-Horta, who said that, of all East 
Timor's agonies, the Balibo cover-up disgusts 
him most. The Foreign Office must be inves-
tigated, he insisted. 
Hugh Dowson is western region development officer Jar 
the United Nations Association in the UK. He works 
with, but does not represent, re/,atives of same of the five 
newsmen murdered at Baliba. 
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